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Risk and loss are common words that need to be clearly defined when embarking on 
the task of assessing operational risks.  Financial institutions may rush into 
implementing the methodologies proposed by Basel in the hope of achieving better 
risk management – or simply to satisfy a regulatory request – but without giving 
enough thoughts to this enterprise.  We show that the methodologies proposed by 
Basel to assess risks and calculate capital requirements are indeed poorly defined and, 
as far as they can be understood, misconceived.  When restricting our attention to 
operational risks we find that their impact in the vast majority of cases is negligible 
compared to other risks, be they credit, market or general business risks.  A few truly 
exceptional operational risks may, of course, lead to catastrophic consequences, but 
then the answer is not in an extra capital buffer that would have to be enormous to be 
of any use.  An attempt to aggregate purely operational risks, as proposed by Basel in 
the so-called Advanced Measurement Approaches, is as futile as it is difficult.  What 
matters in risk management is balancing all risks, whatever they are, against costs and 
revenues.  And risks do not add up; it is the interaction between operational risks and 
other risks and the risk/reward trade-off that is of interest.  Basel recognises this 
broader aspect of operational risk management in its guidance notes for the 
development of an operational risk management framework and the supervision of 
risk management.  Recent redrafting of these notes suggest a change of emphasis from 
loss data collection towards more forward-looking risk assessment and 
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1.  A Critical Examination of Basel’s Proposals 
 
1.1   The Importance of Definitions 
 
Contrary to popular opinion, risks cannot be measured.  A risk is not like a length of hosepipe 
that can be checked by any one with a measuring tape and which can be connected to other 
lengths of hosepipe to reach the back of the garden.  A risk is about the future; it can only be 
assessed by using some model, some hypothetical representation of possible future 
realisations.  A model is necessarily subjective.  At best a group of reasonable people may 
agree to settle on the use of a particular model for a particular purpose, but a model is never 
valid in any objective or absolute sense.  It may be accepted as good enough in a particular 
environment until a better model is put forward. 
 
Strictly speaking, one cannot even measure losses without making some subjective judgments 
or without following some agreed conventions.  What we measure in the financial world and 
add and subtract at will are cash flows.  Accountants are very good at that.  Whether a 
particular cash flow should be labeled a loss rather than viewed as a normal expense depends 
on what we choose to identify as being abnormal:  perhaps it is because someone is to blame 
for incompetence or fraud or perhaps it is an unexpected event, some accident, or perhaps 
still, because it appears to be a useless expense
1. 
 
What I am leading to with these rather philosophical statements is that the definition and the 
assessment of operational risks are not trivial matters.  We need to develop a better 
understanding of operational risks before launching into the calculation of capital charges.  
There is nothing wrong in principle with requesting a capital buffer for any sort of risk but if 
the calculation method is poor, the resulting capital charge will only send wrong incentives 
and I have grave doubts that charges, either imposed indiscriminately or based solely on 
operational loss experience, can do anything to improve operational risk management. 
 
I hope to show that my concerns are pertinent, not pedantic.  It is true that we would be hard 
pressed to give exact definitions of most things, be they as simple as a ‘table’ or a ‘chair’, yet, 
we know where to sit and where to put our plate.  But risks are trickier, they are perceived in 
the mind, they are a reflection of our ability to imagine and weight possible future 
consequences, good and bad, of our actions; they may offset each other rather than add up.  
Poor definitions will distort risk assessments and lead to bad decisions. 
   
Casual assessments of risks may indeed lead to the opposite of the desired effects with 
potentially disastrous consequences.  The supervisor, who ‘prudently’ does not recognize a 
certain risk mitigation tool because it is imperfect, may lead a bank not to use that tool to save 
costs and, thereby, leaves it exposed to greater risks.  The reluctance to accept ‘fair value’ 
accounting because the future cannot be assessed accurately throws a veil over critical risks.  
Developing more risk sensitive capital charges without a mechanism to use the capital as a 
buffer in critical times may turn a minor crisis into a major crash.  Making detailed risk 
monitoring and reporting demands in a format that is one-sided (looking at losses only) and 
                                                         
1 “A distinction is often made between an expense, which is made to benefit the operations of a period, 
and a loss, which is an expenditure that does not benefit anything”, Management Accounting, by 
Robert N. Antony, p13  Antony adds “…there is no great need to draw a fine line between them.”   ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




drowns major losses into a sea of minor ones, may confuse rather than enlighten and will 
detract management’s attention from its primary task of managing crucial risks. 
 
1.2 Conflicting Goals 
 
With its September 2001 CP2 ½ consultative paper on operational risk [1], so called because 
it comes between CP2 and the promised but many times delayed third Basel II consultative 
paper, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (later simply referred to as the Basel 
Committee or just Basel) has relaxed and made more flexible its original proposals for an 
operational risk capital charge under the new accord. 
 
The date for implementing the new accord has also been postponed twice in view of the many 
industry comments, on credit risks as well as on operational risks, pointing to the need for 
further reviews and quantitative impact studies.  The proposals are now said to be on track for 
implementation, at least among the G-10 countries, by the end of 2006.  
 
In the meantime, the Basel Committee has released and recently updated a draft statement of 
sound practices for operational risk management and supervision [2] which, taken with CP2 
½, indicates how Basel intends to apply its ‘Three Pillars’ philosophy (capital charges, 
supervision and public disclosures) to the newly defined field of operational risks.   
 
From these documents, one perceives that Basel strives to reconcile multiple objectives and 
constraints. 
 
First and apparently foremost, Basel wants to leave the overall level of capital requirements in 
the banking system about unchanged whilst introducing more comprehensive and risk 
sensitive methods for calculating these requirements.  But there is also a need to remedy 
accounting inadequacies; so, some future expected losses that are not recognized under 
current accounting standards are added to risk weighted assets in the denominator of the 
capital ratio rather than taken away from eligible capital in the numerator.  Third, there is an 
overwhelming desire to rely on objective inputs and methods in order, one presumes, to 
facilitate the role of the supervisors, those impartial empires of the legendary level playing 
field; that may be over-ambitious when dealing with rare events.  Fourth, there is a need to 
provide methodologies that are accessible to a wide range of financial institutions with 
different types of activities, sizes and degrees of sophistication, hence the idea of providing a 
menu of methodologies, subject to some eligibility criteria.  Fifth, there is a desire to provide 
incentives for better risk management, which translates into reduced capital charges 
(everything else being equal) for those institutions that qualify for and use more advanced risk 
assessment methodologies. 
 
The list could go on and on; many difficult trade offs have to be struck in designing 
regulations suitable for a wide range of banks with varied financial activities.   The old 
reflexes of dividing to conquer in the face of complexity and prudence in the face of doubt 
need to be checked.  Breaking down and analysing risks into more and more components 
allows for the development of specific methodologies adapted to each of these components 
but creates difficulties in aggregating the results.  Apparently safe assumptions, such as 
ignoring offsets that are imperfect or adding capital charges (unless there is empirical ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




evidence of a lack of correlation
2), create a distorted and misleading picture of the relative 
importance of risks. 
 
So, what is achieved by the current operational risk ‘measurement’ proposals? Will advanced 
approaches assist better operational risk management? Should therefore all banks aim to put 
into place an advanced methodology?  Or, is the imposition of capital charges largely 
irrelevant for the task of managing operational risks?  At the time of writing this chapter the 
Basel Committee is still considering evidence on the relative importance of operational risks 
in banking as well as about the impact of the new proposals for credit risk capital charges.  
Basel should be commended for starting this debate and for listening to the industry.  Recent 
postponements may be read as an indication that Basel is more interested in ‘getting it right’ 
than in rushing through untested innovations in banking regulation. There is still time, many 
hope, for some fundamental re-thinking.  
 
 
1.3 Capital Charges Guesswork 
 
It was initially feared that the Basel II proposals would reduce the capital requirements for 
credit and market risks by 20% on average.  Simultaneously, there was the realisation, often 
brutal and embarrassing, that some risks, neither clearly market nor credit but generally 
operations related, such as fraud, terrorism, technology failures and trade settlement errors, 
were escaping the regulatory net.  Indeed the trend towards greater dependence on 
technology, greater competition among banks and globalisation may leave the banking 
industry more exposed to operational risks than ever before.  These circumstances led the 
Basel Committee to propose a new tranche of capital charges for operational risk equal to 
20% of purely credit and market risk minimum capital requirements. 
 
Then came evidence from the second Quantitative Impact Study (QIS2-Tranche1) conducted 
by the Risk Management Group (RMG) of the Basel Committee, which revealed that, on 
average, the responding banks allocate about 15% of their overall economic capital to 
operational risk.  That turned out to be equivalent to about 12% of the minimum regulatory 
capital (MRC) of the reporting banks calculated according to the current Basle I Accord with 
an 8% minimum capital asset ratio
3. 
 
The evidence was weak.  Only 41 banks responded to the questions on operational risk in the 
first tranche of QIS2; they were not given any standard definitions of economic capital nor 
guidelines for the allocation of economic capital to operational risk.  Nonetheless, on this 
basis, and perhaps in response to some other industry concerns, the Basel Committee 
proposed to reduce the operational risk minimum regulatory capital figure from 20% down to 
12% of MRC. 
 
This reduction gave a new meaning to the so-called ‘top-down’ approach!  It was all the more 
welcome by the industry that QIS2 also revealed that the new credit risk proposals are not 
bringing nearly as much reduction to credit risk capital charges as was first expected.  In fact, 
in most cases credit risk capital requirements would increase under the new proposals or 
                                                         
2 [1] Annex 1, Ch3 (n), p19 
3 We shall use this specific definition of MRC throughout this chapter.  Note that, curiously, if on 
average 15% of economic capital equates to 12% of MRC, economic capital calculated by banks would 
be only 80% of  MRC. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 





4, thus leaving no room for a new operational risk capital charge 
unless other capital charges are revised down to keep the total about unchanged.  In fact, this 
is what may well happen: capital charges for both credit risks under the IRB approach and 
operational risks may still be reduced.  
 
Interestingly, QIS2 also collated operational loss experience from 30 Group 1 banks (capital 
larger than 3 billion Euros) over 3 years (1998-2000).  We analyse these results later when we 
examine the calibration of capital charges for the so-called Advanced Measurement 
Approaches that are based on loss experience. 
 
 
1.4 A Critique of the Basic Indicator Approach 
 
Setting the overall size of the new operational risk capital requirement at a certain percentage 
of existing requirements can be done in one stroke; devising a method to allocate this new 
requirement to various financial institutions is more challenging. The allocation should be 
related, one would hope, to some indicator of operational risk, otherwise, the regulator might 
as well reset the current minimum capital ratio to whatever new level he views as sufficiently 
prudent. 
 
In the spirit of flexibility, Basel proposes a menu of three approaches from crude but simple 
to more refined but also more demanding.  At the crude end, presumably for small domestic 
banks, Basel proposes the Basic Indicator Approach as a straightforward way to relate the 
operational risk capital charge to an operational risk indicator. The operational risk capital 
charge is simply calculated as a fixed percentage, alpha, of gross income, whatever the range 
of activities conducted by the regulated institution.  
 
Why gross income? Possibly because it is readily available, it reflects business volume and 
thereby may be related to operational risk exposure.  But the connection is loose. Gross 
income is about the past; risks are about the future.  Gross income does not reflect the quality 
of operational risk management.  Between two institutions with similar earnings, why 
penalize the one with the largest gross income, that is, with the smallest profit margin? With 
this choice of indicator, wouldn’t banks have an incentive to increase profits by reducing 
expenses rather than by increasing gross income, thus possibly cutting down on risk controls 
and mitigation tools? – That has been known to happen in difficult times.   
 
It is somewhat surprising that the Basel Committee has not found other indicators that could 
be more relevant and less liable to perverse consequences.  To explore just one alternative, 
why not choose a few months of operating expenses?  That was used and is still being used in 
some countries as a base capital requirement.  Compared to gross income, it may be rather 
more related to operational risks than to credit or market risks.  There would be no 
disincentive to increase gross income.  Capital requirements could be immediately adjusted 
down in case of rationalisation.  If a bank were in terminal difficulties, the capital charge 
would be strongly related to expenses during liquidation.  On average, three months of 
operating expenses as base capital requirement might not be much different from the target of 
12% of current minimum regulatory capital for the new operational risk tranche; if it were 
different, one could adjust the time period to reach the desired level. 
 
                                                         
4 Only G10 Group1, that is large banks in the most developed countries, may benefit from reduced 
credit risk capital charges if they opt for the Advanced IRB approach ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




And why should there be a linear relationship with a volume indicator? Wouldn’t we expect 
the larger institutions to have more sophisticated operational risk management in place and to 
experience less operational loss volatility than the smaller ones
5?  Indeed it seems intuitive 
that large institutions with diversified activities would be less likely than small, specialist 
institutions to be brought down by, say, fraudulent activities or systems failures. 
 
Undeterred by the potential difficulties of using gross income as the operational risk indicator, 
and apparently without testing the linearity assumption, the Basel Committee proceeded to 
estimate alpha for each reporting bank as the ratio of 12% of MRC over gross income per 
year.  This led to a provisional recommendation for ‘alpha’ in the range of 17% to 20%.  Not 
surprisingly, ratios for individual banks in the survey were widely dispersed.  The latest word 
from Basel representatives at the time of writing is that alpha could be down to 15% of 
average annual gross income
6 over the previous three years.  
 
What the Basic Indicator Approach achieves, compared to imposing a flat operational risk 
capital charge equal to 12% of credit and market risks capital, is that businesses with little or 
no credit or market risks according to current Basel rules, such as advisory services, agency 
services and asset management, will now face operational risk capital charges as long as they 
generate gross income.  Conversely, businesses such as trading, that attract large capital 
charges for market risks but might generate low income at times, will be relatively spared.  
The cost of the extra capital will have a similar effect to a sales tax. 
 
What it certainly does not achieve is to provide incentives for better operational risk 
management.  In fact, the Basel Committee, recognising the limitations of the Basic Indicator 
Approach, very much hopes (or may even demand?) that internationally active financial 
institutions with significant operational risk exposures move up at least to the next level of 




1.6 A Critique of the Standardised Approach 
 
The Standardised Approach will be available to banks meeting some minimum standards of 
operational risk management and control as well as having in place measurements methods to 
track and report operational risk by business lines as defined by the regulator
8.  
 
Surmising that some financial activities are more exposed than others to operational risk, the 
Risk Management Group (RMG) of the Basel Committee proposes to differentiate the capital 
charge according to eight business lines. For each line the operational risk charge is defined 
as a percentage, the beta factor, of a relevant exposure indicator. 
 
                                                         
5 See for example: (i) Jimmy Shih, Ali Samad-Khan, and Pat Medapa “Is the Size of an Operational 
Loss Related to Firm Size?”, Operational Risk, January 2000 and (ii) Joint ISDA-LIBA-BBA 
Response to the Basel Working Paper, May 2001,claiming that a sqare-root function of size or even a 
lower power is supported by empirical evidence.   
6 Gross income will have to be defined according to prescriptions from regulators (eg, Basel intends to 
exclude gains/losses on positions in the banking book) and approved accounting standards.  
7 The possibility has been raised (see [2]  p11) that supervisors could impose additional capital charges 
to sophisticated banks that would opt for the Basic Indicator approach 
8 The EEC may stop short from imposing this last condition. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




The RMG proceeds to make the somewhat unimaginative assumption that the best exposure 
indicator is still gross income for each business line
9.  Furthermore it assumes that operational 
risks still vary proportionally to gross income for each business line (what would happen if 
gross income in, say, trading is negative?) Finally, it states that the total charge will be the 
sum of the charges for individual business lines as if the risks were closely related across 
business lines.  Of course, it is very hard to imagine that low frequency risks in one business 
line, such as corporate finance, could be closely related to high frequency risks in another, 
such as retail banking, but never mind.  
 
All this seems very gratuitous but difficult to debate without a better definition of what Basel 
means by risk.  As we mentioned at the start, we believe that this is a far from trivial matter.  
The Committee defines operational risk as  “The risk of …” thus presuming that ‘risk’ is a 
basic concept that does not warrant clarification.  We might as well accept that whatever 
Basel has decided to measure is what it means by risk. We would remark, however, that the 
Basel measure, which is additive and proportional to volume, would be consistent with an 
interpretation of risk as a sum of cash flows (presumably those classified as losses?).  It could 
not have anything to do with uncertainties since uncertainties are neither additive, nor 
proportional to a number of chance events or to a business volume indicator. 
 
Will the Standardised Approach be more risk sensitive than the Basic Indicator Approach?  In 
theory, it might, but QIS2 shows no clear evidence that different business lines should have 
different betas (See Table 1
10). Basel wants to base the betas on industry-wide experience, but 
stops short of making specific recommendations at this stage; the Working Paper simply 
states that the beta estimates “fall in a range around the alpha level”.  Therefore banks should 
not hope for any reduction in capital charges under the Standardised Approach as a reward for 
meeting the qualifying risk management standards, nor will the quality of their risk 
management affect the capital charge. 
 

















                                                         
9 Basel will provide criteria for the mapping of gross income per business line. 
10 On the left hand column of Table 1 are the eight business lines defined by Basel.  For each business 
line, the interquartile range is the range that contains half the responses in QIS2, with one quarter of the 
responses falling below the lower end (the first quartile) and a quarter falling above the upper end (the 
third quartile).  
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In brief, in its current form, the Standardised Approach is subject to eligibility criteria but 
does not appear to be markedly more risk sensitive than the Basic Indicator Approach.  It 
offers neither any hope of a reduction in capital charges compared to the BIA, nor any 
incentive for better risk management.  As such, it is hard to believe that banks would adopt it 
willingly; it might as well be scrapped. 
 
However it leaves flexibility in the future for Basel to modulate the betas or the choice of 
exposure indicators according to business lines.  Indeed, there are now talks about setting the 
betas between a low of 12% (Retail Banking/ Retail Brokerage/ Asset Management) and a 
high of 18% (Corporate Finance/ Trading and Sales/ Payment and Settlement) of the business 
line gross income (the Commercial Banking and Agency Services lines would be left at 15%)  
subject to periodic reviews of these factors
11. No doubt, there will be hard political 
negotiations around these issues.  There will also be an incentive for ‘cherry picking’, i.e., to 
use the Standardised Approach only for those business lines with betas smaller than alpha, 
and the Basic Indicator Approach for the others.  Supervisors will have to impose rules for 
allowing or disallowing the use of the Basic Indicator and the Standardised Approaches. 
 
Finally, one ironic consequence of the two simple approaches is that banks may retain more 
operational risks than before the imposition of capital charges.  Indeed, managers may reason 
that the new capital buffer makes it possible and more economical to self-insure some 
operational risks that they used to cover with traditional insurance products (e.g., damages to 
physical assets, key person insurance, etc.)  Why should a bank contribute to the profits of an 
insurance company if it has new capacity to self-insure and if insurance cover does not reduce 
the capital charge? 
 
 
1.7 A Critique of the Advanced Measurement Approaches 
 
The carrot of lower operational risk capital charges is promised only to those banks that will 
use an Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) for calculating these charges.  Basel 
announced in CP2 ½ that it does not want to impose a single AMA at this stage but would 
rather see the industry develop their own ideas; “Let one hundred flowers bloom…” as Mao 
Zedong famously said.  But a bank will have to be able to demonstrate to its supervisor that 
its chosen approach captures potentially severe ‘tail’ loss events. By that Basel means 
operational loss levels that have not less than a 0.1% probability of being exceeded over a one 
year horizon.  How can one reliably estimate operational loss levels over one year at a 99.9% 
confidence level, as it were, is a bit of a mystery.  Estimating this level within a factor of 5 or 
10 would already be quite an achievement.  That seems to be the degree of arbitrariness in the 
determination of operational risk capital charges that supervisors will be facing with AMAs 
unless, of course, they bound this range with a ceiling equal to the charges under the 
Standardised Approach and a floor at some fraction of this charge
12. 
                                                         
11 The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) have made it their prime 
recommendation that Basel should commit to review the charges (alpha and beta factors) and their 
impact within two years of implementation and with further periodic reviews [3] 
12 A debate is going on about whether floors and ceilings could be applied to AMA capital charge 
calculations.  On one hand Basel seems prepared to accept ‘cherry picking’ of methodologies according 
to business lines; i.e, a bank could select the Basic Indicator Approach for some marginal business 
lines. The Standardised Approach for other lines and perhaps an AMA for some core activities, thus 
implicitly accepting that banks could choose the least onerous methodology.  On the other hand, Basel ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 





So Basel has stepped back from imposing the Internal Measurement Approach (IMA) it had 
put forward earlier.  Nonetheless, it has kept some basic features of the IMA as minimum 
quantitative qualifying requirements among which: (i) any AMA must be ‘bottom up’, that is 
rooted in loss experience, as opposed to the two simpler ‘top-down’ approaches which apply 
industry wide parameters; (ii) each bank will have to monitor its loss experience and make 
use of the loss experience of other banks according to 56 categories of losses corresponding to 
all combinations of the eight business lines defined in the Standardised Approach and seven 
loss event types defined in CP 2 ½.; (iii) the risk ‘measure’ (read, I suppose, the 99.9% 
confidence level estimate or the capital charge) must be supported by loss data and 
appropriate analytics; (iv) the total operational risk capital charge should calculated as the 
sum of charges for individual risks in the absence of ‘specific, valid, correlation estimates’
13 
(v) there must be regular ‘validation’ of parameter estimates and results based on subsequent 
loss experience or other techniques. 
 
More details and specifications (eg, requirement to use a minimum of 5 years of loss 
experience) should be released in a forthcoming set of ‘Rules’ to be released by Basel. To 
these requests Basel adds a few strong recommendations such as: (i) to quantify risks as 
multiples of expected losses; (ii) to calculate capital requirements as the sum of expected loss 
and unexpected loss unless the bank can demonstrate that it is making adequate reserves for 
expected loss or is pricing expected losses into its products and services.  
Regrettably, we think that some of these requests and recommendations work against the 
objectives of greater risk sensitivity of operational risk capital charges and makes it nearly 
impossible to achieve a coherent calibration with other capital charges  
 
 
(a) Problems with recognising losses 
 
All Advanced Measurement Approaches will be based on operational loss experience.  Basel 
defines an operational loss as a “loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people and systems or from external events”.  We are assumed to be able to identify a loss 
and to decide whether it should be categorised as ‘operational’ according to its cause. 
 
What is a loss?  It is of course extremely difficult to define precisely anything that pertains to 
the real world (the world of mathematics is far simpler).  Most of the time, approximate 
definitions suffice, but that is not the case here.  Those who have tried to construct operational 
loss databases know the difficulties. 
 
A loss is defined by accounting standards and other conventions that may vary from activity 
to activity (e.g., accrual accounting in a banking book or fair value accounting in a trading 
book) and country to country.  Generally speaking, a loss, as opposed to a profit, is a negative 
net result over an accounting period.  But for the purpose of Basel we need to label as losses 
specific negative cash flows resulting from some types of causal events. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
is unlikely to accept reversions to simpler approaches once an advanced approach has been approved.   
The issue of a floor for AMAs is more contentious; an initial demand by Basel to set a floor at 75% of 
the Standardised Approach has caused much criticism and may be withdrawn.   
13  CP2½ (page 20): “In the absence of specific, valid correlation estimates, risk measures for different 
business lines and/or event types must be added for purposes of calculating the regulatory minimum 
capital requirement”.  How correlations (the wrong measure anyway) between rare events can be 
‘measured’ with any degree of accuracy would need to be explained.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 





Is that sufficiently clear? Perhaps it is in very rare, high impact cases.  Take a rogue trader, a 
major systems failure, an act of terrorism or other rare situations with potentially disastrous 
consequences.  No doubt the damages they may cause should qualify as losses, although it 
may still be difficult to decide upon the extent of the losses to be reported.  Some of the 
largest consequences could be regarded by Basel as indirect or difficult to measure (e.g., 
reputational effects) and therefore not reportable under the operational loss label.  There may 
also be positive consequences such as insurance payments, indemnifications or other 
recoveries; should they be taken into consideration? 
 
That was the extreme case; consider now more common examples, say, fraudulent use of 
credit cards, transaction settlement errors, complaints from clients or staff.  Should the 
consequences be recorded as losses?  These are, no doubt, undesirable incidents but they are 
usually regarded as part of the course.  One would not stop a profitable business purely 
because of such problems unless they really get out of control.  As such, why should they be 
reported as losses and justify capital charges rather than be budgeted as expenses? 
 
The issue here is twofold: (i) how to assess the expected and measure deviations from it 
(positive as well as negative) to gauge uncertainty
14 and (ii) how to account for the expected.  
In an extreme high impact, low probability case, the expected loss is small compared to the 
possible losses and might therefore be ignored.  In the more common low to high frequency 
cases, say for loss events that have more than one chance in 10 of occurring per year, 
expected losses are sufficiently large not to be ignored.  They should be budgeted.  
 
If an activity is under fair value accounting there is no problem.  All relevant future cash 
flows (positive and negative) are supposed to be included in the accounts on an expected (in a 
mathematical sense) value basis; this is what market values, if they exist, do automatically.  
The fair value of an activity will, of course, evolve over time.  Some values become realised, 
some unrealised values change with new information, others are added with new business; 
those variations in value reflect the volatility or ‘riskiness’ of the activity. 
 
If, on the other hand, an activity is under accrual accounting (and most banking activities still 
are!), there is no ready basis to assess risks.  I do not see any alternative other than to overlay 
fair valuation for the purpose of risk assessment.  Some may argue that in accrual accounting 
there are provisioning and reserve mechanisms to account for probable losses. But 
provisioning rules are restrictive and one-sided as accounting standards seek to maintain 
objectivity as well as prudence.  For example, according to IAS37, specific provisions for 
operational losses should be made when and only when there is a reliable estimate of a 
present obligation resulting from past events.  In other words, specific provisions are 
restricted to highly probable future losses and have nothing to do with mathematically 
                                                         
14 In common parlance expected (unexpected) is an expression similar to regarded as highly probable 
(unlikely).  In mathematics, the expected value of an uncertain quantity has a very specific and different 
meaning; it is defined as the sum of all possible values weighted by the respective probabilities we 
attach to them.  It is a value that is not necessarily likely; indeed, it may be an impossible value.  In the 
operational risk management literature, the expression unexpected loss is sometimes used but it may be 
ambiguous for the reasons explained above.  Should it be interpreted as an improbable outcome  
(common sense) or as a measure of deviation from the (mathematically) expected?  We shall use 
expected in its mathematical sense but shall refrain from using unexpected for fear of causing 
confusion. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




expected losses and gains.  Even after adjustment for specific provisions
15, therefore, it 
remains a matter of judgment to determine what the expected net results (ie, margin of gains 
over losses) are. 
 
In brief, there is little point in trying to assess operational risks separately from other risks to 
which they are associated and even this limited objective would require a great deal more than 
the recording of certain negative cash flows labeled ‘operational losses’.  All major costs and 
revenues attached to a particular activity and their variability should be assessed.  That is the 
key problem. 
 
(b) Problems with distinguishing operational losses from other losses 
 
By comparison, deciding whether the causes of a loss event are operational rather than, say, 
credit or market related should be relatively easy and, at any rate, inconsequential for 
calculating capital requirements, as long as there is no double counting.  In theory, capital 
requirements should be consistently calibrated and it should not matter greatly whether a risk 
is categorized as credit, market or operational; in practice, of course, it may make a 
difference.  It is also informative to understand the source of a risk in order to improve risk 
management; many a bank that has conducted an operational risk review will have discovered 
that losses that were casually attributed to market or credit had actually their roots in 
operational risks.  
 
Of greater importance is the distinction between reportable operational risks, on the one hand, 
and business and reputational risks, which are not recognized in the current proposals, on the 
other.  Casual observation suggests that these unaccounted risks, as well as the consequential 
damages from operational risks, may be more significant than the direct operational losses the 
industry has been asked to monitor.  It looks as if these other risks are left out not because 
they are small but because they are difficult to assess; it is the reasoning of the man looking 
for his keys under the lamp-post, not because he lost them there, but because it is the only 
place where he has enough light to see clearly. 
 
Consider, for example, the losses of Jo Jett at Kidder Peabody.  In 1994 Jo Jett was accused of 
having recorded $350m of fictitious profits (and of having collected an $8m bonus in the 
process); Kidder went bankrupt.  By Thanksgiving 1997 Jett was cleared of the major charges 
against him (although he was fined $200,000 for “books-and-records violations” and ordered 
to return his bonus).  It turned out that he had been asked to close down rapidly a huge bond 
portfolio; profits had evaporated in the process.  So, had it been a liquidity risk or business 
risks or an operational risk, and if the latter, how much would have been reportable?  Look at 
Natwest Markets; in 1997 the FSA, the UK regulator, imposed a fine for their failure to notice 
an overvaluation of some interest rate options to the tune of £77m.  Few will remember the 
name of the trader; a loss of £77m should not have been a fatal blow for a bank recording 
profits in billions.  But the situation had been concealed; heads had to roll; the market lost 
confidence in the ability of Natwest to manage derivatives portfolios and, eventually, the bank 
was sold. 
 
One could multiply the examples where loss of reputation and consequential loss of business 
far exceeded any direct loss and where the initial cause was a combination of circumstances 
                                                         
15 General provisions should not be taken into account, as they are included in Upper Tier 2 capital. 
The treatment of general provisions is a clear example of the inability of accrual accounting principles 
to cope with probabilities and therefore with any form of risk assessment. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




where poor business judgment as well as perhaps a dose of human incompetence and even 
downright deception played a role.  Should these events be ignored because they do not fall 
neatly into the codified categories of credit, market and operational risks? 
 
 
2. Analysis of Reported Operational Loss Data 
 
2.1  Operational Losses Reported in the Second Quantitative Impact 
Study 
 
Mindful of the difficulties in identifying and assessing operational losses, we now review the 
evidence gathered so far about their relative importance.  Industry associations and 
commercial enterprises have been busy constructing operational loss databases for several 
years.  But following the specification in CP 2 ½ of the type of operational losses that should 
be recorded and of the matrix of 56 loss categories into which they must be catalogued, some 
early data gathering exercises have become largely obsolete.  Many of the remaining publicly 
available data sets, either from commercial sources or from co-operative ventures,  are 
suspect of being severely biased and cannot claim to represent an industry average
16.  So, 
rather than venture into a discussion about the possible merits and shortcomings of various 
databases, we shall limit our attention to the data collected by the Basel Committee in their 
own Second Quantitative Impact Study. 
 
In a review of QIS2-Tranche 2 data published in January 2002 [4], The Risk Management 
Group (RMG) of the Basel Committee, reminds us that it is “necessary to be cautious in using 
these data to draw any conclusions about the extent of operational risk exposures…” 
However, after carrying out their own clean-up and standardization, the RMG claims to be 
“… reasonably certain that the data … do not have significant reporting errors or 
inconsistencies”.  At any rate, these are the main data that have been used by the RMG to 
conduct calibration exercises.  
 
Thirty banks reported individual operational loss events exceeding ￿ 10,000 and quarterly 
aggregates over a three year period (1998-2000) as well as quarterly information on a wider 
range of potential exposure indicators related to specific business lines.  The banks are spread 
across 11 countries in Europe, North America, Asia and Africa but the sample may not be 
representative of the banking industry as a whole.  In particular, all respondents but one are 
Group1 banks, that is, they are international and diversified banks with a Tier 1 capital in 
excess of ￿ 3 billion.  Furthermore the data may not even be very representative of the sample 
as 19 banks were unable to make any representation about the comprehensiveness of their 
reports.  
 
With all these caveats in mind, let us look at the data.  They are best represented on decimal 
logarithmic scales because of the wide ranges of reported frequencies and severities.  Figure 1 
shows the reported losses in each of the 56 regulatory categories with frequencies vertically 
and severities horizontally.  The frequency scale runs from -3, meaning one event in a 
thousand years, to +3, meaning one thousand events per year.  The severity scale runs from –
6, or one millionth of the current minimum regulatory capital (MRC), to 0, meaning the total 
MRC of an average bank in the sample.  Scaling to MRC is essential to gain an appreciation 
of the relative importance of the recorded loss events. 
                                                         
16 Haubenstock, M.,“Loss Data” , Operational Risk, December 2000 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 









Loss frequencies per annum for an average bank in the sample were obtained by dividing the 
total number of reported losses by 90 (3 years x 30 banks). Scaling loss severities to the MRC 
of an average bank in the sample required some guesswork; the RMG is unwilling to reveal 
the regulatory capital of the respondents, even as a group total.  On the basis of some back-of-
the-envelope calculations, it seems safe to assume that the average MRC (calculated at the 
minimum 8% solvency ratio, as we have done previously) for banks in the sample is well in 
excess of ￿ 3 billion
17; an average two or three times larger would not be surprising but to 
avoid understating the losses as a percentage of MRC, we assumed the average bank had a 
MRC of just ￿ 3 billion
18. It should also be noted that the data in Figure 1 is for gross losses 
before insurance and other recoveries.  Although answers to the questionnaire were difficult 
to interpret on this topic, it appears that there was a recovery rate of about two thirds on one 
                                                         
17 We know that 29 banks out of the 30 bank in the sample have Tier 1 capital in excess of ￿ 3 billion; 
we also know that a majority of banks have the cheaper eligible Tier 2 capital up to the level of Tier 1; 
finally we know that most of the large, internationally active banks have a solvency ratio above the 8% 
minimum but not largely above.  Therefore it is likely that for the average bank in the sample, MRC is 
well above ￿ 3 billion   
18 Note that, consequently the ￿ 10,000 reporting cut-off in QIS2 corresponds to about –5.5 on the 
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third of the significant losses
19.  Net losses after recovery would therefore be only about 78% 
of the reported figures. 
 
 
2.2 Estimation of Average Losses 
 
In Figure 1, categories of equal average losses lie along straight lines running diagonally from 
top left to bottom right.  The diagonal line in bold and marked ‘-3’ represents an average loss 
equal to one thousandth (0.1%) of minimum regulatory capital per year.  Only three 
categories in QIS2 contribute average gross losses in excess of 0.1%
20. Total gross losses 
amount to $2,613 million for the thirty banks over 3 years, or, at a maximum, 1% of their 
minimum regulatory capital per year. 
 
Of course, any loss event that has less than a 1% probability of occurring per year is unlikely 
to appear in this collection of 90 bank-years of data.  But we shall explain in a moment that 
the contribution of these rare events to average losses is small, perhaps of the order of another 
1% or 2% per year.  On the other hand, it is likely that the reported losses were more than 
covered by expected profits in the corresponding business lines.  As we have also neglected 
recoveries and underestimated the average capitalisation of the banks in the sample, it seems 
fair to conclude that the reported average operational losses are negligible compared to 
capital. 
 
We have been careful to speak about ‘average’ when reviewing historical observations.  
Turning to the future, we shall speak instead about expected losses.  Now it may well be that, 
despite our low ‘average’ findings, for a particular bank at a particular time, management 
could ‘expect’ significant operational losses over the following year.  Logically, any material 
expected loss that is not covered by an expected future profit should be deducted from 
regulatory capital.  If this is not possible, whether for regulatory, accounting or other reasons, 
an alternative with similar effect on the solvency ratio should be sought, for example, adding 
12.5 times (or 1 over the minimum solvency ratio) the excess expected loss to the risk 
weighted assets at the denominator of the solvency ratio
 21.  
 
2.3 Estimation of Loss Variability 
 
Quite rightly the authors of the review of QIS2-Tranche 2 findings on operational losses point 
out that “To assess the extent of risk, it would be necessary to assess the extent of variability 
of both number and value of loss events around their expected, or mean, values...Simple 
tabulation of the data … does not supply significant insight in this regard.  To gain insight, it 
would be necessary to model this variation, an exercise that is beyond the scope of this 
                                                         
19 Interestingly, only 15 to 20% of recoveries came from insurance; other recoveries must 
have been obtained from counterparties (i.e., reported losses were not irreversible) or from 
various indemnifications. 
20 Respectively (i) Retail Banking/ Clients, Products and Business Services; (ii) Trading and Sales/ 
Execution, Delivery and process management; and (iii) Commercial Banking/ External Fraud. 
21 The effect is similar only if the excess expected loss is still small compared to the regulatory capital 
(say less than 10%) and the target ratio is 8%.  More generally, one could add  y = x/r(1-x/N) to the 
denominator rather than subtracting the expected excess loss x from the numerator N when the target 
solvency ratio is r. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




paper…” Possibly! But someone could have attempted this exercise before suggesting capital 
charges. So let us try.  
 
Suppose that all we know about each loss category is (i) the frequency of arrival of loss 
events and (ii) the average loss severity.  The minimally prejudiced inference
22 we can make 
is that the loss event process is Poisson (i.e., the arrival time of the next loss event is 
independent of the arrival time of the last loss event) and that the distribution of loss 
severities is exponential.  These assumptions can be modified as soon as further information 
becomes available.  For example, we might become aware of some pattern in the arrivals of 
loss events (either bunched up during some periods or, on the contrary, regularly spaced) or 
that the dispersion of loss severities (standard deviation) is larger than their average.  
Whichever model is used, model parameters can be tested against historical data, but 
management will have to use their judgment to select the model in the first place and then to 
choose parameter values to forecast future losses. 
 
A general property of a process with a random number of loss events, N, over a certain period 
and an independent distribution for the loss severity, L, per event, is that the uncertainty of 
total losses over the period, X, as expressed by its variance, is: 
 
Var(X) = E(N).Var(L) + Var(N).E(L)
2     (1) 
 
where E( ) stands for the expected value and Var( ) the variance of a random variable.  In 
particular, if N is Poisson distributed and L exponentially distributed, then Var(N) = E(N) and 
Var(L) = E(L)
2 and therefore (1) reduces to Var(X) = 2.E(N) .E(L)
2 
 
Of course, no model is absolutely right and this one is no exception. We should hasten to test 
our hypotheses.  No doubt information will flood in with operational risk managers, 
consultant, information vendors and regulators actively analyzing data and building up 
models.  Already, there is some evidence that the dispersion of loss severities per risk 
category (at least for some important categories) could be wider than that of an exponential 
distribution
23, so, to avoid understating risks, we double the variance of the severity to Var(L) 
= 2.E(L)




The last step is to relate the variance of total losses over the period to the capital requirements 
suggested by Basel, that is, capital sufficient to cover losses over one year at a 99.9% 
confidence level
24.  If annual losses were normally distributed, the 99.9% confidence level 
would be about 3 standard deviations from the mean.  That would be the case if annual losses 
were the sum of a many similar losses, say, for risk categories where the frequency of 
occurrence of losses is greater than 10 per year.  For lower frequencies it is not possible to 
equate the 99.9% quantile to a set number of standard deviations; it matters how many loss 
events register at that confidence level.  For example, the 99.9% quantile for an arrival rate of 
one loss event per year would correspond to 4 loss events, but for an arrival rate of 3% per 
                                                         
22 We qualify as minimally prejudiced the inference that is compatible with the information at hand 
without making additional assumptions.  Formally, it is the maximum entropy probability distribution 
that matches the available information (where entropy is a general measure of uncertainty in 
information theory).   See for example M. Tribus, Rational Descriptions, Decisions and Designs, 
Pergamon Press (1969), p121 
23 The distribution of loss severities across loss categories would be, of course, far broader, the loss 
categories being themselves important indicators of loss severities.  
24 Total losses over the period are henceforth referred to as annual losses. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




year, only one loss event would register and for an arrival rate of 0.1% or below, none would 
register, i.e., the capital requirement would suddenly disappear. 
 
So, for risk categories with a loss occurrence rate of 10 or more per year, we assume a normal 
distribution for total annual loss and calculate the capital charge as three standard deviations 
or, 
 
Capital charge = 3(3.E(N))
1/2 E(L)    (2) 
 
Categories with equal capital charges would again line up on our log frequency/log severity 
diagram, but this time the lines would have a slope of –2 
25.  This is what Figure 2 shows; 
equal capital requirements lines run down from left to right twice as steeply as the lines of 
equal expected losses.  The line in bold marked ‘–3’ corresponds to a capital requirement 
equal to one thousandth of the current minimum regulatory capital. 
 
As the frequency falls below 10 per year, the equal capital charges lines start bending to the 
right and approach the horizontal line at a frequency of one in a thousand years. 
 
 





























                                                         
25 Taking the logarithm of (2) and rearranging the terms gives: 
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To calculate a total capital requirement at the 99.9% level for all operational risks, an 
additional factor must be taken into account, namely, the extent to which various categories of 
operational risks may be mutually dependent.  Intuition strongly suggests that risks from 
different operational causes and in different business lines should have little to do with each 
other; they would not share common factors.  In other words, they should be largely 
independent of each other.  In that case, a simple summation of individual variances would 
yield the total variance.  Under the normality assumption for the total of all losses, the QIS2 
data would then show a total capital requirement for operational risks of less than 1% of 
current minimum regulatory capital
26.  If, in addition, we assume that operational risks are 
largely independent from credit and market risks, the relative importance of operational risks 
compared to credit and market risks would be only five in one hundred thousand
27. 
 
On the other hand, if we were to accept the rather ridiculous assumption that losses with about 
0.1% chance of occurrence per year in each of the 56 loss categories would all happen 
together if they happened at all, then we should add up capital requirements across all loss 
categories, as Basel suggests 
28. Total operational risk capital charges would then reach 3.7% 
of current minimum regulatory capital requirements. Yet, if we still held the view that 
operational losses are largely independent of credit and market risks, we would still conclude 
that, on the basis of observations from QIS2, the marginal influence of operational risks on 
total capital requirements should be less than one in a thousand
29; again, a negligible effect. 
 
What may not be negligible is the interaction between operational risks and uncertainties in 
costs and revenues in the corresponding activities, uncertainties that Basel has chosen to 
ignore so far.  Financial institutions seek to achieve a balance between risks and returns; 
operational losses are a small part of this equation.  Basel has chosen to raise the level of 
awareness about these losses.   But by concentrating exclusively on operational losses and 
requiring an aggregation of purely operational risks, banks have to engage in an exercise that 
is as difficult as it is futile.  The possible dependencies between various types of operational 
risks, whether it is between frequencies or severities or both, are bound to be less important 




                                                         
26 Alternatively, assuming binomial distributions for independent rare events, the total capital 
requirement as defined by the 99.9% quantile would be even less than 1%.  Indeed for very rare loss 
events only one occurrence might be significant at the 99.9% confidence level and therefore the 99.9% 
quantile for the sum would be the same as the 99.9% quantile for the single event with the largest 
severity. 
27 The total standard deviation and therefore the total capital requirements should be increased by (1 + 
(0.01)
2)
1/2 – 1 = 0.00005  
28 CP2½ (page 19), states that a bank would be allowed to “... recognise empirical correlations ... 
provided that it can demonstrate that its systems for measuring correlations are sound and implemented 
with integrity.  Note that empirical correlations of rare events are almost impossible to obtain and that 
correlation would not be a meaningful measure of dependency anyway. 
29 The total capital requirement would be the square root of the sum of the squares of requirements for 
credit and market risks, on one hand, and operational risks on the other, that is (1 + 0.0372)1/2 = 1.00068 
compared to a requirement of 1 without operational risks. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




2.4 Beyond QIS2 Data – High Impact, Rare Events 
 
Lets us now address the issue posed by the very low probability but possibly very large 
impact events that are absent from QIS2.  It is easy to imagine disasters that would have 
between one chance in a hundred and one chance in a thousand of occurring per year and that 
would therefore enter into the scope defined Basel for capital requirements although, 
thankfully, most banks would not have incurred in the past.  Losses caused by a skillful rogue 
trader, an act of terrorism, a crippling lawsuit, a major security breakdown have been 
observed in the banking industry and are recorded in several industry-wide databases.  How 
would they affect expected results and uncertainties for a single firm?  Industry-wide data 
may be useful as a checklist to help us imagine what disasters could possibly befall a 
particular firm, but firm specific estimates should take into account the particular business 
profile, organization, quality of controls, etc., that characterize the firm. 
 
Without entering into specific considerations, we shall try to guesstimate the impact of 
exceptional losses.  Our first judgment is that events absent from QIS2 data would still have a 
low impact on expected losses.  The missing events would have probabilities below a few 
percent per year.  If we were as pessimistic as to assume exceptional losses as large as 30% of 
minimum regulatory capital with total probability of 3%, their contribution to expected losses 
would still be only 1%; add a few one chance in a thousand catastrophes were the entire 
capital could be wiped out, we would have an additional contribution to expected losses of 
perhaps another 1%.  Since the expected return on capital of a bank is typically 10% to 15% 
per year, the expected loss due to the missing rare events should still be small compared to 
expected profits. 
 
Our second guess is that exceptional losses could indeed be large compared to the capital of a 
bank.  Basel demands a buffer against operational losses at the one chance in a thousand 
confidence level. Now suppose one bank in a thousand per year could be fatally hit by some 
operational loss (perhaps a slightly pessimistic view compared to historical records, but not 
unreasonable if vulnerability to operational risks is on the increase), would it not follow that 
banks would need to increase significantly their capital, perhaps doubling it up, as a 
protection against these extreme risks?  Of course, that would be inconsistent with the other 
view from Basel that the current global level of capital in the banking industry is sufficiently 
safe and should not be changed.  In other words, the level of confidence required to determine 
operational risk capital charges is a very sensitive number: a 99% level could mean an 
insignificant increase in capital charges for operational risks whereas a 99.9% level could 
mean a doubling up of capital charges; what should it be? 
 
Setting a satisfactory confidence level is about as challenging as tweaking an old manual 
shower to find that elusive comfort zone between freezing cold and boiling hot. In fact there 
may not be any satisfactory level.  One that would lead to a capital charge of the order of 10% 
of existing capital charges (Basel’s wish) would be simultaneously too onerous for 
operational losses as reported in QIS2 and useless as a buffer against catastrophic losses.  To 
continue our watery analogies, it would be rather like carrying a tiny umbrella when the 
probability of rain is small. 
 
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




2.5 The Arbitrariness of Operational Risk Capital Charges 
 
The banking industry is keenly aware of the advantages of maintaining a high credit rating 
and therefore of maintaining capital commensurate with the risks undertaken.  Most banks, at 
least among G-10 countries, would find it unacceptable to be rated below single ’A’; the cost 
of funds would increase materially, credit lines would be restricted, business would tarry 
unless more promises were made to clients and therefore greater risks were undertaken thus 
possibly leading to a downward spiral.  There is little argument, therefore, with Basel’s plan 
to expand the role of capital charges as buffer against a wide range of risks, to make the 
capital calculations more risk sensitive and to set the minimum standards to correspond to the 
single ‘A’ rating level or thereabout. 
 
But for operational risks as we understand them today, the Basel top-down approaches are 
arbitrary and the bottom up approaches, even if left entirely to the design of the industry, will 
be almost impossible to calibrate.  Medium to high frequency risks should require only 
negligible capital whereas high impact, low frequency risks might require a huge amount of 
extra capital to meet the confidence level targeted by Basel.  Fortunately there are better ways 
to cope with the latter risks than by increasing capital
30.  
 
Thus Pillar 1 for operational risks is inconsistent and ineffectual. The data Basel wants to be 
collected is arbitrarily defined, one-sided, incomplete and therefore incapable of being 
assembled into a meaningful whole. It is obviously very weak for rare events even when 
external databases are taken into consideration.  Surveys
31 have shown that only a minority of 
banks collect internal loss data in a systematic way and although one third of banks may 
subscribe to external loss data, only a third of that third find any interest in it other than 
complying with Basel quantitative standards for using an Advanced measurement Approach. 
 
Operational risk capital charges, as currently defined, are even dangerous because they 
produce a distorted picture of risks by concentrating on losses rather than the whole range of 
uncertainties in earnings, and using untested linearity and additivity assumptions less any 
departure from such assumptions be supported by empirical evidence.  These calculations 
divert resources and detract management and supervisory attention from more important 
problems.  There are still blind spots in the regulator’s field of vision such as business risks 
and the banking book black hole for market risks, both on assets and liabilities.  There are still 
calibration problems to be resolved with credit risks and aggregation problems between 
various kinds of risks, in particular between market and credit risks.  
 
There are also dangers lurking in embracing ready-made solutions to the assessment of capital 
requirements.  The recent focus on operational risk has been a godsend for many consulting 
firms; they are pleased to offer solutions at a price; banks are willing to pay for the aura of 
objectivity and credibility a consultant brings to the exercise. Consultants come equipped with 
operational loss data pooled from various external sources.  This data is somehow filtered and 
scaled and combined with the client’s internal data to form the basis on which extreme losses, 
at the 99.9% confidence level, are estimated.   Whichever specific method is used, suffice to 
say that it requires substantial extrapolations. It is fundamentally difficult to assess 
probabilities and severities of future extreme events that are essentially firm specific as they 
depend on unique combinations of persons, organization, activities, markets, locations, 
                                                         
30 See for example Part IV of this book on ‘Operational Risk Management’, Chapter 15 in particular. 
31 See for example “Emerging Trends in Operational Risk within the Financial Services Industry”, a 
survey conducted by RAFT International; available from its website: www/raft.co.uk. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




systems, etc.  Industry wide databases showing a few
32 examples of very large operational 
losses will stimulate management’s imagination about potential dangers, but it is unlikely that 
any of the observed extremes could translate immediately into an assessment of probability 
and severity for a specific institution
33.  No amount of simulation can make up for the lack of 
a proper assessment of probabilities. 
 
In short, at this stage, it would seem wise to pursue the discussions on operational risk capital 
charges but to delay the erection of pillar 1 until better plans are produced. 
 
 
3. Other Supervisory Proposals 
 
In the Basel scheme, Pillar 1 – capital charges – is part of a group of three pillars that are 
expected to reinforce each other.  Pillar 2 – supervision – is designed to ensure that an 
operational risk management framework has been developed within each institution and that 
the process of operational risk management is adequately audited and supervised.  Pillar 3 – 
public disclosures – is expected to bring market pressure for good operational risk 
management through the disclosure of operational risk management methods and exposures. 
 
The roles that supervision and public disclosures are expected to play have been substantially 
revised in the latest draft from Basel on Sound Practices released in July 2002 [2].  The first 
draft was published in December 2001 and has attracted a number of comments from the 
industry as well as supervisory authorities.  It is particularly interesting to note the main 
alterations to the first draft. 
 
3.1 Pillar 2: Increased Reliance on Supervision 
 
(a) The operational risk management framework 
 
Pillar 2 reaches beyond the qualitative and quantitative requirements stipulated for the 
calculation of operational risk capital charges.  Pillar 2 requires that “all banks, regardless of 
size, have an effective framework in place to identify, assess, monitor and control or mitigate 
material operational risks as part of an overall approach to risk management”.  I quote here 
Principle 8 of the revised draft of the Sound Practices document [2] because, I am sure, all 
the words have been carefully chosen and are, as one says, operative.  To be sure: 
 
(i) It is addressed to “all banks, regardless of size” whereas the previous draft simply 
mentioned “banks”.  I would not be surprised if , in fact, the implementation of this 
principle is spread beyond banks to other financial institutions in the spirit of 
harmonisation of supervision across financial services. 
 
(ii) “An effective framework” (a better word than the former ‘system’) is defined by what it 
is supposed to do, namely, “identify, assess, monitor and control or mitigate material 
                                                         
32 If a large industry-wide data bases contains comprehensive operational loss data from a thousand 
banks over 10 years it will still show only about 10 extreme events at the one chance in a thousand 
confidence level. 
33 To wit: in March 1995, following the Barings debacle, practically all bank CEOs in the UK were 
asked by their board “Could this happen to us?”  (the Bank of England also raised the same question); I 
surmise that the answers were generally ‘no’ and were supported with good arguments.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




operational risks”.  Elsewhere ([2] par.10 p4) these activities altogether are used to 
define what Basel means by the ‘management’ of operational risks.  Therefore, Basel is 
concerned that all banks should have an effective framework (or structure, or 
environment) for the management of material operational risks. 
 
(iii) Note also how the definition of management has evolved from the previous draft: 
‘assess’ replaces ‘measure’ (very wisely, in my view!) and ‘mitigate’ is added to 
‘control’ (again, very wisely, if I understand well the meaning) 
 
(iv) Finally this framework should be “part of an overall approach to risk management”.  
That is not new but is clearly restated and reinforced in other places. 
 
It is a common frailty of human nature to read in a text what one would like to see, but I 
cannot help believe that the Basel Committee has expressed concern for the quality of the risk 
management process in all financial institutions, which, to be effective, must be adapted to the 
characteristics of each institution.  It has stressed that operational risks are part of all risks, 
that attention should be concentrated on the most significant risks and that these risks should 
be managed, that is (my reading) not just ‘measured and controlled’ (an accounting, backward 
looking view) but identified, assessed and mitigated (a forward looking, pro-active view). 
 
All this is water to my mill (see Chapter 15 for illustrations of operational risk management 
problems) but it makes the task of supervision all the more demanding because more 
subjective and all embracing than before. 
 
The Sound Practices document puts flesh on the concepts outlined above.  It spells out what 
the framework should consist of, what should be the roles and responsibilities of various 
parties, the reporting flows, the need for qualified staff, independent audit, etc…So, 
supervisors can conduct objective checks as for a car’s M.O.T: has it got brakes, lights, etc., 
do they function adequately…so, is the car road-worthy?  But unlike M.O.T. inspectors, 
supervisors must also check the quality of the drivers: are they qualified, fit, of good 
character, not under undue pressure, etc. 
 
The M.O.T analogy, like any analogy, can help illustrate a point, viz. that there is something 
objective about a risk management framework that can be inspected, but like any analogy, it 
fails when pushed too far.  In this case, there is no hiding from the fact that the inspection or 
supervision of a bank’s risk management process is much more complex and subjective than 
checking the road-worthiness of a car or even the fitness of its driver.  The problems faced by 
risk management are highly complex and the goals largely subjective. 
 
(b)  Challenges for Supervisors 
 




There is no hiding the fact that the implementation of Basel II proposals will be very costly. 
Figures in excess of ￿ 100 billion have been put forward just for gearing up to the new rules, 
i.e., excluding the cost of running the new system and, in the case of operational risks, the 
cost of remunerating whatever additional capital charges are imposed.  Supervisors, in 
particular, will have to increase their staff and ensure that they are properly trained and paid. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 





Can we expect commensurate benefits in return? If the global effect of the new rules were 
simply that ‘approved’ banks would be recognised as having at most a 0.1% probability of 
default, that is, would be confirmed as single ‘A’ or better, whereas banks that would fail to 
meet Basel’s criteria would be, as it were, black-listed and therefore pushed further down into 
a limbo, would consumer and society as a whole benefit? It could be argued that rating 
agencies and financial analysts, i.e., the market in general, already do a decent job and that 
Basel’s criteria, sophisticated as they are or will be, are still crude (for example, ignoring 
wide fields of business and reputational risks). 
 
One must therefore believe that the Basel rules are contributing additional benefits such as a 
better understanding of risks and consequently, more efficient use of capital and other 
resources. Basel could be viewed as a forum for the promotion of better risk management in 
the banking industry.  But then, one could also argue that banks have natural incentives to 
improve the quality of their risk management and that there are already many institutions such 
as universities and professional bodies whose main role is to carry out research, disseminate 
information and promote knowledge. Is Basel in a privileged position to carry out this 
educational function? Probably not in general, but there are some areas, such as systemic 
risks, where the concerns and perhaps the knowledge of regulators and supervisors go beyond 





The documents from Basel stress the importance of maintaining a close dialogue between 
regulators and the industry.  That is all very well, but regulators make rules that bind and 
punish; industry representatives could be excused for feeling a bit nervous.  If they are to 
design a stick for there own back and ropes for their feet, may the stick be light and the ropes 
not too tight. 
 
The dilemma is the same at the enforcement level.  “We are looking for a frank and open 
discussion”, says the supervisor, perhaps forgetting to add “But remember that we make half 
of our revenues from imposing fines”.   
 
The policeman cannot be the confessor, indeed the confessor vows not to speak to the 
policeman.  Both play useful but separate roles; supervisors should not delude themselves into 
thinking that they can do both.  Should there be two types of supervisors, or should there be 
simply a clearer distinction between the various types of information to be exchanged, from 




Basel claims in various places to have a ‘good understanding’ of risk management; we can 
only be thankful for that.  Supervisors, likewise, would like to know and understand as much 
as possible about the firms they examine.  What could be wrong with that? 
 
The nub is that supervisors could get too close to their patients.  If a patient closely attended 
by his/her doctor falls gravely ill or, god forbid, dies, the doctor feels at least some moral 
responsibility.  If a supervisor has a good understanding of a bank and, as it were, gives it a ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-20 




clean bill of health, or dispenses the correct medicine, what happens if the bank subsequently 
falls into deep troubles? 
 
There seems to be no escaping the chain of logic: understanding the bank, enforcing 
appropriate corrective measures, sharing in the responsibilities for failure.  What is clearly 
needed are legal powers and legal protection for supervisors.  These may not be sufficiently 
well defined in many countries. 
 
Legal matters will be concerned with the fine line between supervising a risk management 
framework and being perceived as approving specific decisions.  A methodology or the 
fitness of an individual is part of the framework.  Supervisors can ‘recognise’, i.e., accept the 
use of a methodology or the presence of an individual in a given function at a given time 
(which recognition should be subject to regular reviews) but should stop short of ‘approving’ 
of people or methodologies which could be interpreted as expressing a backing or even a 
warranty.  In the same line of thoughts, supervisors should not necessarily be made aware of 
specific decisions less they be perceived as condoning these decisions. 
 
 
3.2 Pillar 3: Public Disclosures and Market Discipline 
 
Operational risk is the risk that does not dare speak its name.  There is a stigma attached to it; 
no one likes to own-up to a mistake.  It is therefore very difficult to trace causes internally and 
perhaps even more difficult to explain to the public how an operational loss took place. 
 
There is also a danger in revealing too much about operational losses (as well as about near 
misses, which could be more numerous and more instructive).  Vulnerabilities should not be 
divulged for fear of increasing exposure.  Reasons for failures could destroy confidence and 
thereby cause consequential damages that could far exceed direct losses.  Revelations could 
interfere with the process of recovering damages. 
 
Basel is well aware of the need for discretion in certain areas.  Sources of information 
collected in surveys are kept confidential as well as many raw data..  Supervisors are also 
keen to maintain confidentiality in their own assessments of risks for fear of causing damages 
to the banks they inspect.  For example, it is well known that the UK supervisor, the FSA, 
carries out their own risk assessments of all banks they inspect.  It helps then determine a 
profile for each bank according to its intrinsic business risks and the quality of its controls.  
On that basis, the FSA makes free use of its authority to set solvency ratios for the more 
‘risky’ banks well above the minimum 8% ratio set by Basel.  Both the ratings of the FSA and 
the trigger ratios are given in confidence. 
 
It is somewhat comforting, therefore, to note that Basel has stepped back from earlier 
intentions to request a comprehensive public disclosure of operational risks loss data and 
exposures as well as management methods.  In as much as the definitions of losses and 
‘measurements’ requested under Pillar 1 are still unclear and arbitrary, it would be rather 
premature and not very illuminating to request their public disclosure now.  Even in the long 
term, it does not appear to be wise to force banks to reveal operational loss data and 
exposures for the reasons mentioned above. 
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On the other hand, banks would see no harm, and potentially some benefits, in disclosing 
operational risk capital requirements provided that a measure of capital requirement that 
makes sense has been generally agreed; still a tall order!  
 
Disclosing the operational risk assessment approaches that a bank has put in place appears to 
be the most beneficial type of disclosure.  To have real value, it should be part of statutory 





To paraphrase, “It’s the management, not the measurement, s….!”.  The Basel Committee has 
been very busy trying to improve risk management in banking but has been tied up in 
measurement problems.  There are several reasons for that state of affairs (desire for 
objectivity, prudence, level playing field, menu of solutions, capital incentives, etc.) but the 
great culprit is certainly the lack of a proper basis for risk assessment in accrual accounting.  
The current trend towards fair value accounting will facilitate the work of regulators.  In the 
meantime they have to make various compromises, trying to alleviate inadequacies of the 
accounting system with strange calculations of capital requirements. 
 
The strange calculations include assumptions of linearity of risks with size of bank or 
business activity, additivity of capital charges across widely different types of risks, 
estimations of ‘unexpected losses’ as multiples of ‘expected losses’ and perhaps, most 
importantly, setting as an ultimate goal the estimation of the extreme tail of a total operational 
loss distribution.  As we explained, such assumptions and methods are baseless and the 
estimation of a total operational loss distribution is as difficult as it is futile.  Other risks, costs 
an rewards matter.  We think that such calculations are even dangerous because they create a 
distorted picture of risks and divert management’s attention from critical issues.  If carried out 
as requested in the most ‘advanced’ approaches, the calculations would justify only negligible 
capital requirements for common risks but possibly enormous capital requirements for 
exceptional risks.  In other words the results are arbitrary and one might as well do away with 
capital charges for operational risks, at least for the next few years.  
 
What is important is to improve the quality of risk management and the Sound Practices draft 
document produced by Basel is helpful in that respect.  It demands that an effective 
operational risk management framework be put in place in all banks.  Effective could be 
understood as meaning adapted to the bank, concentrating on the most significant risks, their 
identification, assessment and control or mitigation.  This framework should be an integral 
part of general risk management and, indeed, of good management. 
 
Of course, it is a tall order for supervisors to examine, discuss, evaluate and even promote 
such risk management frameworks.  At the same time, supervisors should be careful not to 
become involved in the management of banks; they would have to share responsibility for any 
failure.  Several related issues would merit a more public debate: a cost/benefit analysis of the 
new Basel proposals; the extent of the legal rights and the legal protections to be extended to 
supervisors, the benefits and drawbacks of various types of public disclosures.  There is 
always more work to be done!    
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